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Abstract 
Corruption has been widely defined as ‘the misuse of public power for 
private gain’ and symptomized a dysfunctional nature of political a 
system. This article identifies another ramification of the terms 
‘corruption’ and/or ‘prebendalism’ within the prism of the Nigerian 
political culture. Whilst acknowledging the importance of the ‘grand 
narrative’ in the conceptual interpretation of the term, this article seeks 
to go beyond this state-centric analysis by invoking ‘spoilization of the 
system’ approach to explain how informalized nature of corruption and 
other acts of societal impropriety not least, financial fraud tagged ‘419’, 
‘oil bunkering’ etc operating at the micro and indeed unofficial level of 
the state impact negatively on state-society relations. This article 
examines the manifestations of the ‘spoilization of the system’. Hence, 
the aim of the article is not to underscore the superficiality of the 
prevalence of the state-centric discourse on spoil politics in Nigeria or 
to enunciate a global theorizing; rather it attempts to explore the 
neglected conceptual relevance and context peculiarities that fit into 
the dynamics of unofficial corruption of the state as an additional 
discourse to the on-going debate on corruption in the Nigerian state.  
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Introduction: redefining corruption and prebendalism 
 
This article sets out to argue that studies on Nigerian political economy of corruption (i.e. 
‘corruption’ ‘prebendalism’) are seemingly narrow and analytically framed within the 
context of ‘grand-narratives’ interpretation of the term. However, this definitional 
inadequacy is not far-fetched from the rooted convoluted arguments on the ambiguity 
and complexities involved in offering a substantive empirical and scientific explanation 
of corruption more particularly in the context of Africa and Nigeria in particular. For 
Chabal and Daloz: 
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The study of corruption is beset with analytical and practical difficulties. In 
the first instance, it is virtually impossible to agree on a workable definition 
of the phenomenon. Second, there is no convenient interpretative 
framework which helps explain the links between the various levels (micro 
and macro) of corruption. Finally, and most obviously, it is difficult, when 
not downright impossible, empirically to observe the phenomenon in a 
scientifically meaningful way (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p96). 
 
Valorizing Chabal and Daloz’s analysis above this article argues that the normative 
precept (i.e. existing discourses) of explaining the nature of corruption in Nigeria is beset 
by analytical polarization that premised ‘corruption’ at the micro level. Conceptually, the 
existing literature focused much on explaining the dominant state-centric nature of 
‘grand corruption’ with empirical neglect of the informalised ‘spoilization of the system’ 
approach, which equally affects state-society relations. This article attempts to bridge this 
gap by first invoking two lone voices in the ‘corruption’, and ‘prebendalism’ literature 
Rose-Ackerman (1999), and Richard Joseph (1991) as analytical precursors of 
understanding the underlying notions of the bourgeoning discourse on corruption and 
prebendalism and the theoretical ramification of Nigeria’s ‘spoiled system’ debate. 
 
Corruption as defined by Rose-Ackerman ‘is the misuse of public power for private gain’ 
and basically epitomizes a symptom that something has gone wrong in the management 
of the state’. State institutions designed to govern the state are contrarily used and 
manipulated for personal enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt; this 
nature of corruption is generally referred to as ‘grand corruption’ (Rose-Ackerman: 1999, 
p9).Where as, prebendalism denotes a political trait in which high premium is placed on 
the state as the avenue of personal accumulation and competition to gain access to the 
state is a ‘zero-sum game’. Richard Joseph’s pioneering work on Nigerian politics (Joseph: 
1991), adopted the Weberian term ‘the prebend or pretender’ to literally interpret the patterns 
of Nigerian politics. The term prebendal entails, ‘the patterns of political behavior which 
reflects as their justifying principle that the offices of the existing state may be competed 
for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as that of their 
reference or support group’ (Joseph:1991:63 &1998:54).In this context, the ‘state’ is 
regarded as a ‘congeries of offices susceptible to individual cum communal 
appropriation’- the statutory purposes of such offices become a matter of secondary 
concern however, much that purposes might have been codified in law or other 
regulations or even periodically cited during competition to fill them 
(Joseph,ibid,p55).Furthermore, Szeftel has plausibly synthesized both definitions in this 
way: 
 
Corruption and class formation rest on prebendalism, on the control and use 
of state position and state power and office, once acquired must be held, 
sometimes by whatever means necessary (Szeftel:2000a:302). 
 
These two approaches of defining corruption are considered in this article as meta-
narratives and  fall within the conundrum of the official state-centric approach or what 
Eghosa Osaghae referred to as the ‘corruption-soaked elites and governments’ 
(Osaghae:2008). The definitions when viewed in-depth within the context of the re-
emerging dynamics of Nigerian domestic politics seems to be problematic, narrow and 
more importantly imprecise. Hence, current discourses on the nature of corruption in 
Nigeria needs further elucidation because of the benign complexities involved in the 
general pattern of its manifestations. this  is because dominant research focused much on 
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explicating formal pattern of corruption/prebendalism that precludes the role of the 
informalised bloating of the state through nuances of corrupt related issues (see Forrest: 
1986, Joseph: 1991, Lewis: 1996, Abubakar:2001).Thus, there is enduring implications of 
this binary distinction of the state-orchestrated corruption through the bureaucratic 
machinery and the one operating at the social fabric of the society. 
 
To avoid such conceptual inadequacy, this article argues that analysis should transcend 
the ‘grand corruption’ paradigm by broadening the corruption/prebendalism literature 
through what  I referred to as the ‘spoilization of the system’ approach as a way of attempting 
to provide a more integrative way of explaining both the ‘top-down’ and ‘down-top’ 
patterns of corruption-prebendalism in Nigeria. The term ‘spoilization of the system’ is 
exactly used in this sense in which Morris Szeftel applied it to explain the spoil system in 
Zambia; but analytically widened to rightly fit into the current parameters in which 
Nigeria’s-style of corruption operate. The ‘spoilization of the system’, occlude both the 
formal, (including bribery, looting of state coffers, over-invoicing of contracts, illicit sales 
of oil blocks and bureaucratic salary fraud etc) and the informal corruption such as (fraud 
through financial scam tagged as ‘419’ in Nigeria, extortion, culture of impunity, oil theft 
and bunkering, marginalization, pay offs to political thugs, by political  godfathers  etc 
(HRW:October,2007,p31).The later, transpired at the unofficial levels but has far-
reaching implications on the legitimacy of the state.This informalised culture of 
corruption/ prebend, has in recent years become endemic culture of societal impropriety 
the society. As the looting of state treasury through the complex structures of 
prebendalised bureaucracy continue apace, it consequently diverts state funds to private 
use. This pattern of spoil system rooted in the lack of state’s capacity to bring succour to 
the populace and desperate to meet the necessities and day to day survival, the 
impoverished populace resort to this axiomatic logic and device of fast-tracking process 
of fraudulent accumulation. The ‘preponderance of economic and financial crimes that 
manifest unofficially like the ‘Advance Fee Fraud’: 419, Money laundering, oil bunkering, 
etc equally have had negative impacts on the Nigerian state (see, EFCC, 2008). For 
instance, it de-attracts foreign direct investment and tainted the country’s image globally.  
 
 ‘Spoils system’ versus ‘Grand corruption’: A framework of 
analysis 
 
Since independence, corruption has become a salient feature of the Nigerian state and 
since became routine in the awarding of government contracts and in the regulation of 
the economy and official business in general (Whitaker: 1991:266).In fact, most 
government decisions including legislative bills and litigation came to involve financial 
considerations put plainly as bribes. In a government-managed economy observed 
Whitaker, the opportunities for bribery is endless, and in Nigeria, they proliferated 
(Ibid).This argument is captured by Garba that ‘the fight for booty or ‘national cake’ is 
fierce and often vicious. It has at times led to a debilitating corruption in the arena of 
public policy making and implementation’. Who gains, who loses in these federal, state 
and local policy arenas is rarely an accident. More often than not, the distributional 
consequences of public policies are the intended result of the private interests which 
have been instrumental in their design, passage and implementation. For the entire 
country, the manipulation of public policy for private purposes comprises yet another 
disjunction in our fractured history. Not every public policy fails; and not every public 
programme or project is redundant. But, when once in a while a policy succeeds, it is 
often not because of government per se, but in spite of it’ (Garba, 1995, p.237). 
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The rent-seeking mentality, driven to a pathological extremity in many developing 
countries like Nigeria in the words of Omeje, causes the state to largely sacrifice the well-
being of the populace in policy-making and governance in preference for the self seeking 
interests of state officials and the hegemonic elites (Omeje:2008:2).Indeed, the adverse 
effect of chronic corruption and lack of transparency in the acts of governance has 
structurally crippled the post-colonial Nigerian economy, shattered institutional capacity 
and totally compounded legitimacy deficit problem of the state. The Transparency 
International’s 2006 Corruption Perception Index ranked Nigeria more corrupt than 37 
out of the 45 African countries. This may hinder the country’s prospect to meet the 
MDG’s targets and being one of the top 20 global economies by 2020 (Transparency 
International,2006).According to Forrest, bureaucratic corruption and the large scale 
privatization of public funds intensified under civil rule subalternly elevated corruption to 
an important aspect of political life and came to dominate discussion of public affairs. It 
was also a central mechanism in terms of resource allocation. Generically, corruption in 
the political economy framework of Nigeria was not a new phenomenon and was widely 
held that the military taught the politicians how to do it (Forrest: 1986:20).The final 
phase of state patronage and grand corruption in Nigeria became more apparent in the 
economic expansion of the 1970s under civil rule between 1979-1984.Corruption became 
more systematic in imports licensing, inflated public contracts, over invoicing of imports, 
illegal foreign exchange deals, smuggling and fictitious pay rolls were rampant 
(Forrest:Ibid,p21).This pattern and trend of corruption was to be cynically perfected 
decades later into the struggle for spoils with the state and the mass of the Nigerian 
people positioned as victims with the few beneficiaries who control state apparatus 
continue to pull down the legitimacy of the state. 
 
According to Human Rights Watch Report (2008), Nigeria has earned well over US$ 223 
billion in oil revenues since the exit of the military rule in 1999 (HRW: 2008, 
p137).Subsequently, by March 2008, the country’s anti-graft watchdog EFFC conducted 
what is considered a high profile corruption probe into the conduit of Nigeria’s ‘spoil 
politics’ in the past 50 years. The report indicates that Nigeria in the last five decades has 
earned nearly half a trillion dollars in oil revenue; an amount pundits argues dwarfed the 
total international aid to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this huge oil revenue, 
an investigation by (Africa Confidential, 1999) also revealed that almost 70 percent of the 
population wallows in the vortex of abject poverty and despair. Ironically, the 
blossoming oil wealth has not reflected in the standard of living of the great majority of 
the population. Today ‘across Nigeria, public services have deteriorated and poverty is 
growing, sharpening ethnic divisions and fostering an ever shriller parochial politics in 
which ethnic group’s clans and sub clans battle for the shrinking national cake’ (Africa 
Confidential:1999).Thus, corruption argues Lamorde ‘had taken an unprecedented 
stature, assuming an alarming cultural dimension and frustrating all attempts at effective 
economic growth and a descent expression of development’. 
 
The logic and pervasiveness of patron-client networks, as well as the deeply entrenched 
culture of domestic capitalist accumulation and resource distribution portrays the very 
nature of struggle for the spoils in Nigerian politics (Omeje: 2004, 2006:478).Therefore, 
the ‘rentier’ state status of the Nigerian state as well as its post-colonial politics of 
prebendalism has in fact become the dominant and defining characteristics of the state. 
In that, successive governments have mismanaged the oil wealth, ‘salting it away in 
foreign bank accounts rather than investing in education, health and other social 
investment and mismanaging the national economy to the point of collapse’ .This 
phenomenon, however, has rendered the state as an institution unpopular, lacking 
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legitimacy and domestically threatened because of the parochial interests it represents vis-
à-vis its failure to deliver national development. The absolutist, predatory and personalist 
monopolization of state power has deepened the crisis of the post-colonial Nigerian state 
(Lewis: 1996, Joseph: 1998, Obi: 2006). 
 
For instance, after eight years of what was perceived as Nigeria’s longest and most 
uninterrupted democratic transition; former president Olusegun Obasanjo earned 
himself the tinted image from the Nigerian press as the most bizarrely corrupt leader in 
Nigeria’s history. This is largely not far-fetched from the startling revelations from the 
senate probe of the country’s power sector in February 2008 that starkly discovered that 
the ex-president ‘aided and abetted’ the misappropriations of about $16 billion spent by 
his administration on the sector. Yet, Nigerians barely live with steady electricity supply 
for eight hours in a day (see Vanguard Newspaper, March,2008).The Senate Committee 
on Power’s probation of the Obasanjo’s regime was to open the door for stunning 
ramifications of his eight years of chronic politics of looting. Besides, corruption 
pervades all levels of government during the past eight years of the Obasanjo’s 
administration. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s government earned an estimated $223 billion during 
his eight years due to rising oil revenue in the international market but evidently, the 
country lost a minimum average of $4 billion to $8 billion annually to corruption; a figure 
that equate between 4.25 percent and 9.5 percent of Nigeria’s total GDP in 2006 
(HRW:2007).However, while the power sector probe availed Nigerians with the privilege 
of hearing of state fraud in billions of dollars but the NNPC probe by the Nigerian 
lawmakers later proved to be the ‘grand theatre’ of rot and fraud in billions of dollars 
between 1999-2007.These were the years when Chief Olusegun Obasanjo straddled the 
‘theatre’ as both president and petroleum minister. Reports, and petitions from both 
within and outside the corporation including an audit report conducted by the 
corporation itself have all come up with one verdict; NNPC is a running story of fraud 
and is undeniably, the country’s melting port of corruption and a monument to graft 
(The Sun Magazine, April, 2008).  
 
At the preliminary stage of the parliamentary probe of the country’s oil sector, the 
Speaker of the parliament Dimije Bankole alleged that the NNPC does not have the 
exact record of what the country earned from crude oil sales since 1968. For example, 
there is no record anywhere in Nigeria of how much a barrel of oil has been sold. There 
is no clear record of the prices of oil in the last 40 years. The Department for Petroleum 
Resources DPR has failed to account for the exact figure realised in the last 40 years. 
Similarly, in June, 2008 the Special Adviser to the Nigerian President on the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Tunji Olagunju remarked in a 
conference on Nigeria’s Country Review Report (CRT), on the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM); that Nigeria lost about 3.5 trillion naira ($29.7 billion) to corruption 
in the last four decades. He noted, ‘corruption is responsible in large measure for broken 
promises, the dashed hopes and shallow dreams that characterized the lives of most 
Nigerians in the past four decades’ (Leadership Newspaper, June, 2008). 
The horrendous scale of institutionalised official corruption has had cataclysmic effect on 
the crippling economy and reinforced the ugly face of poverty and underdevelopment in 
the country. The Human Development Report 2007/2008 has ranked Nigeria the 80th 
poorest country among 108 developing countries in the world and 158th with low 
human development index. Nigeria’s HDI score is 0.470, lower than South Africa, 
Algeria and Egypt with 0.674, 0.733, and 0.708 respectively while it also ranks behind 
smaller countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti and Eritrea at 127th, 149th and 
155th respectively. Even on Human Poverty Index (HPI) Nigeria, ranked 80th among 
C o r r u p t i o n  i n  N i g e r i a :  c o n c e p t u a l  &  e m p i r i c a l  n o t e s    | 170 
108 developing countries with a value of 37.3 per cent (Human Development Report, 
2008). The poverty index, according to ADB, measures severe deprivation in health by 
the proportion of people who are not expected to survive age 40 while HDI measures 
standard of living, human capital development and life expectancy. The contradiction 
inherent in the Nigerian political economy is that as an OPEC member and among the 
top 10 highest producers of petroleum in the world, the country as at April 22, 2008 had 
a proven ‘Excess Crude Account’ reserve at the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) of 
$ 15.76 billion. It is revenue earned due to skyrocketing of price of oil in the world 
market to record high of $ 134 per barrel in March 2008 (See Guardian & Daily Trust 
Newspapers April, 2008).According to Miss Arunma Oteh, the Vice President of African 
Development Bank (ADB): 
Nigerians need not suffer. Nigeria is unique in Africa, with the country 
accounting for half of the population and more than two thirds of the output 
within the sub-region of West Africa. Nigeria contributes 11.0 and 16.0 per 
cent of total output and foreign reserves respectively in Africa while also 
accounting for 15.0 per cent of its population. 
 
Yet, in another mind baffling, investigation by the Human Rights Watch in January 2007, 
(see Chop Fine: 2007), into the Rivers State’s high level of official corruption, had 
classically exemplified how oil windfall in Nigeria has been lost to extravagance, waste 
and flagrant corruption that characterized the nature of spoil politics throughout the 
country.Politicians often, siphon oil revenues allocated to their states and local 
governments. They tend to award contracts for gigantic projects, budgeting of large sums 
of money as security votes, making returns to Godfathers, employment of ghost workers, 
sponsorship of foreign trips, diversion of workers’ salaries and budgeting funds for 
projects financed by other tiers of government, oil companies or multi-lateral agencies 
(Ukiwo: 2008:85).Indeed, Rivers state is one among the 36 states of Nigeria with a 
population estimated between 4 to 5 million people. In 2006, the state government 
budgeted the whopping sum of $ 1.33 billion for the fiscal year; an amount that 
comparatively out-figured  the whole of Mali’s same year  budget of $ 1.29 billion, 
Guinea’s $642 million and Niger’s  meager $ 320 million. Moreover, the findings of this 
study shows that enormous sums of state’s government’s funds have been channeled 
into the office of the state Governor more often on vague grounds which perhaps 
include: expenditure on unspecified and unjustified donations; personal contributions to 
radical youth groups and organizations for patronage, or spending on unspecified so-
called ‘Special Projects’ which have no direct bearing on improving the life of the 
citizenry of the state (HRW,2007).Corruption is therefore, fuelled and facilitated 
throughout the Nigerian state by government’s lack of accountability in the conduct of 
official acts of governance.  
 
The informal ‘spoilization of the state’ 
 
However, as argued elsewhere in this article, the term ‘informal spoilization of the state’ 
is applied for typological clarity to conceptually distinguish the state-centric corruption 
that involves the bureaucratic machinery of the state and the culture of corruption; that 
focuses on more pervasive forms of societal impropriety. In a thought provoking 
expository study on the content of corruption in Nigeria, Daniel Smith’s (see ‘Culture of 
Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria’, 2007), focuses on the 
pervasive culture of corruption that manifests in forms of deception and malpractice that 
comes to tragically symbolize the nature of the Nigerian state. The colossal level of 
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‘extocization’ typified as the 419 fraud and fraudulent fraud is emphatically central to the 
understanding of everyday culture of deception and discontent in Nigeria (Smith, 2007, 
p.608).  
 
The unofficial ‘spoilization of the system’ is largely associated with the audacious 
segment of the alienated social category, comprising mostly of the young unemployed 
graduates who exploit the advantages of globalization through what Kenneth Omeje 
describes as ‘non-rentier high stake device’(Omeje: 2006:6).Non-rentier high stake device 
operates through wide range of methods from the use of the internet technology and 
transnational banking to internationalize high stake accumulation via ‘advanced fraud 
scam’- 419 and other extraverted means of fraud. This pattern and ramifications of spoil 
system is rooted in the lack of state’s capacity to bring succour to the populace and 
desperate to meet the necessities and day to day survival, the impoverished populace 
resort to this axiomatic logic and device of fast-tracking process of fraudulent 
accumulation.This fast-tracking unofficial spoilization of the Nigerian state manifest in 
three fundamental ways: the 491 financial fraud, the issue of illegal oil theft or what is 
popularly termed as ‘oil-bunkering’ in Nigeria and the politics of ‘godfatherism’ that 
operates through the rooted culture of impunity. 
The ‘419’ fraud scam 
The ‘419’ as a financial fraud-scam operate at the informal level but has notoriously   
become synonymous with the Nigerian state. This so-called ‘Advanced Fee Fraud’ or 
‘419 scam-bating’ has in the last decade become a booming industry in Nigeria and 
spilled-over sporadically to its neighboring countries and even beyond. Indeed, ‘419’ 
literally, is a codified ‘section 419’ of the Nigerian penal code; the section that specifically 
prohibits any financial related scam and fraud. Today, however, it has become a global 
syndicate operating based on the network of fraudsters who falsely used fake financial 
related references and correspondences of financial institutions such as: fake bank 
accounts and websites, falsified company names, registration of incorporations of 
corporate institutions. It also involves sending people emails requesting their help in 
exporting a lump sum from Nigeria; falsify Nigerian government documents for luring 
fraud contractual formations with victims and numerous instances of bizarre 
informalised illegalities. Indications are colossal on how the advanced fee fraud grosses 
hundreds of millions of dollars annually and the losses to victims are continuing to 
escalate. Recently, the scam generally targeted at small and medium sized businesses, as 
well as charities. It globally operates increasingly in countries like Russia, Southeast Asia, 
Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the US. It manifests, through the receipt of an 
unsolicited letter purporting to come from someone who claims to work for the Nigerian 
Central Bank or from the Nigerian government. The Central Bank of Nigeria denies all 
connection to those who promote this scheme. The syndicates flourish by reeling in their 
victims who have been suckered by the promise and desire of riches beyond the wildest 
dreams of avarice. For instance, in September 2007, a multi-million dollar ring has been 
cracked in Nigeria’s biggest city of Lagos. The crackdown on the fraudsters who were 
using postal services saw 15, 000 counterfeit cheaques written to the value of more than 
$4 million intercepted in just a month. Furthermore, tones of mail were sifted to look for 
documents sent by ‘Advanced Fee’ conmen; the discovery paved the way for a major 
international criminal investigation. The anti-fraud police also found fraudulent 
identification papers and forged financial documents concealed in such a way as to 
prevent them from being picked up by security scanners (BBC, April, 208).This incident 
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is one among the proliferating cases of international financial fraud dominating global 
media that become anointed with the Nigerian state. 
Oil theft: ‘Bunkering’ 
 
Furthermore, militia and local community groups assisted oil theft and ‘bunkering’ has 
become a thriving business and has remarkably risen in the Niger-Delta region in the last 
few years. From 2003, militia groups in the region targets the country’s mainstream crude 
oil production as a grand strategy of pressurizing the central government to reach their 
demands. The principal militia group was the Niger-Delta People’s Volunteer Force 
NDPVF (see LegalOil.com).The group headed by Alhaji Asari Dakibo and later joined 
by MEND and (NDV) led by both Henry Okah and Tom Ateke who resorted to oil 
theft i.e. oil bunkering as a means of financing their operations.Meanwhile, oil theft 
‘bunkering’ is predominantly controlled by the militia groups as a way of financing their 
insurrections in the Niger-Delta region. It is also argued that it is organized through vast 
state-centred syndicate implicating high ranking military officers, politicians, the security 
apparatuses, and even the Niger Delta special military task forces and the navy coast 
guards (Watts:2008:59), deployed by the state to pacify the region of high scale 
involvement.Substantial evidences, indicates that the militia engaged only in little theft 
and bunkering but provide a cover and security to the various local and international oil 
theft cartel. At the local level, the security forces including the Nigerian Navy deployed 
to maintain peace were also ‘settled’ with cash payments to ensure military operations 
and patrol did not interfere with illegal bunkering as indicated by a report on illegal sale 
of crude oil, which was considered by President Olusegun Obasanjo (LegalOil.com.np.). 
 
In 2003, the Federal Government estimates as much as 300,000 barrels per day of 
Nigerian crude illegally freighted out of the country (Legal Oil; Opcit).Government and 
oil company sources indicate that between 100 million to $250 million barrels of crude 
oil are stolen each year, representing an income to the thieves of approximately $1.5b to 
$4b annually. This figure represents a loss to the Nigerian government of between $1.48b 
to 3.72b.However, in the last few years; there is seemingly a shifting trend in oil theft in 
the Niger-Delta region from the earlier militia oil bunkering/theft to a more discernible 
‘official theft’ or ‘official oil racketeering’ prevalent. Since 2003, ‘official oil theft’ has 
substantially increased. Oil industry experts estimate that about 50,000 to 100,000 barrels 
per day of oil is smuggled out of the country through an alleged help from senior state 
officials in the oil industry, the government and indeed the military. In the same vein, an 
estimate from legaloil.com indicates that the ‘official oil theft’ from 2003 to 2004 to 
about the same or equal figure to that stolen through militia assisted ways. This, therefore, 
put altogether, the total amount stolen through cargo theft to around 120,000 barrel per 
day in 2003-2004.The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that at one 
point, Nigerian cargo theft ran into a staggering 200,000 to 300,000 barrels per day. 
Apparently, IMO estimates the cargo theft at about 80,000 barrels per day with a value of 
US$ 1.6 billion annually (Legal Oil: Opcit).In April 2008, Legal Oil report (2005) 
indicates that the theft of oil cost companies, government and the communities they 
serve hundreds of million of dollars each year in Nigeria alone. In addition to loss of 
revenue, oil theft fuels violence and insecurity, feeds corruption, finances the purchase of 
weapons, corrupt youth, escalates youth unemployment, causes environmental pollution 
sand destabilizes communal life. 
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The politics of ‘godfatherism’ 
 
Nigeria’s politics of ‘godfatherism’ falls with the analytical link between political violence 
and corruption that manifested throughout Nigeria during the eight years of the previous 
government and beyond. Political ‘godfatherism’ is both a symptom and a cause of the 
violence and corruption that together permeate the political process in Nigeria. 
Ordinarily, not all candidates vying for political office in Nigeria can single-handedly 
mobilize sufficient funds to compete in the country’s corrupt and violent political system. 
Consequently, in many parts of the country successful candidates are more often those 
‘sponsored’ by wealthy and powerful individuals known in Nigerian parlance as political 
godfathers (HRW:Opcit,p33).Therefore, those elected under the mighty support of their 
so-called ‘godfathers’ owe unflinching loyalty to their godfathers whose support helped 
in occupying their exalted positions; thus, incur debt that they are expected to re-pay 
endlessly throughout their tenure in office (Ibid,p34).This phenomenon has become an 
instrument of mobilizing political violence that characterizes the present Nigerian 
democratic space since May 1999, continues to flourish, and fed on corruption supported 
by the seemingly deeply entrenched culture of impunity. 
 
Conclusive remarks 
 
This study sketches out the nature and dynamics of corruption and/or prebendalism at 
both the macro and micro level of the Nigerian political economy of decline. This article 
argues that the manifestations and trend of spoil system and other societal acts of 
malfeasance calls for a more nuance prognosis in scholarship for the understanding of 
the term ‘corruption’. The argument is that there is an intrinsic link between mis-use of 
official resources for personal aggrandizement with the current pervasive nature of spoil 
system. Failure of governance and the ‘cunning to milk’ the state approach by the few 
have deepened the phenomenon of poverty. Compelled by the negative impact of ‘graft 
politics’ that excluded the majority of the populace, most Nigerians resorted into series 
of societal illegalities that becomes the norms of the society. The lingering wave of 
financial fraud code named as ‘419’, ‘oil bunkering’ ‘kidnappings’ has strains the ethical 
disposition of the state and come to tenaciously spoiled the entire socio-political and 
economic fabric of the state. Thus, the colossal rate of grand corruption as well as the 
political economy of criminality at the informal level paved the way for the term 
‘spoilization of the system’  used in this article. This argument is now presented in order 
to spark a debate between the universal enunciations of ‘grand corruption’ operating at 
the official state versus ‘spoilization of the system’ triggered by the former by taking into 
account the distinctive characteristics of the political economy of states. 
 
Notes 
 
1. I borrowed Morris Szeftel’s uses of the terms like fraud, extortion, nepotism, payoffs 
etc in Zambia’s case of graft, spoil system analysis, and broadly applied it into the 
Nigerian case where corruption is endemic and exhibits more complex pattern (see 
ROAPE: Vol.9 no.24 pp4-21.  
2. The term ‘spoilization of the system’ is used in this article to explain the ramifications 
of corruption in Nigeria that operate at the informal sector while having inherent 
implications to state-society relations in the same way the official state orchestrated 
nature of corruption does to the state. 
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3. ‘Godfatherism’ in Nigerian local politics connotes, someone by virtue of political 
influence or/and immense wealth sponsors a political candidate vying for any 
electoral position in Nigeria. When duly elected, the political ‘godfather’ in return 
anticipates unconditional loyalty from his ‘political-son’.  
4. Miss Arunma Oteh was the Vice President of African Development Bank (ADB). 
Oteh made this remark on the 2nd Vanguard Newspaper Nigeria Bankers Award 
lecture held on the 17 of April 2008 in Lagos: see Daily Trust Newspaper 22 April, 
2008 Lagos. 
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